The accompanying excerpted article from Izvestia discusses Russian plans to put a naval base in Sudan. Although a formal agreement has yet to be signed, it appears that the broad brushstrokes have been agreed upon. Reportedly, the base will garrison up to 300 personnel and have berths for four ships. The author of the article proffers that this base is an opportunity to again exert influence in the Indian Ocean.
The accompanying excerpted article from Novaya Gazeta, written by renowned journalist and military scholar Pavel Felgenhauer, discusses the general reasoning behind Russian extraterritorial naval bases. Felgenhauer posits that due to Russia cannot adequately project power on the high seas because of its lack of large naval vessels. This lack of a blue-water navy has lead Russia to pursue other means of controlling strategically important seas and shipping lanes, namely through the use of extraterritorial naval bases. These naval bases not only support the operations of naval vessels, but also provide ground-based area denial capabilities in the form of antiaircraft and anti-ship missiles. Felgenhauer believes that Russia’s current activities in Syria have little to do with fighting Islamic extremism and are, instead, oriented on more traditional strategic concerns and force projection. If Felgenhauer’s theories prove correct, it suggests that Russian efforts to secure extraterritorial naval bases in Crimea, Syria, and Sudan were not opportunities of chance, but instead part of a broader Russian strategy of globally integrated operations.
Russia is awaited in the region [Indian Ocean]. Moreover, not only by countries that were previously in the zone of the Soviet influence, such as Mozambique, Madagascar and the Seychelles, but also other states on the coast of East Africa and islands of the Indian Ocean. In the conditions of Chinese, Indian, European, American economic expansion, the presence of another interested player will give them an opportunity to pursue a more flexible policy, maneuver and negotiate, in exchange providing Russian companies with contracts, and the navy with bases and supply centers.
Source: “Aleksey Kupriyanov, “В Африку гулять: что даст России военное присутствие на берегах Индийского океана (To Africa for a Stroll: What Will Russia Gain From Military Presence on Shores of Indian Ocean),” Izvestia Online, 16 November 2020. https://iz.ru/1086965/aleksei-kupriianov/v-afriku-guliat-chto-dast-rossii-voennoe-prisutstvie-na-beregakh-indiiskogo-okeana
Russia received the right to establish a “ logistics support center” for its navy on the territory of Sudan. In fact, we are talking about the return of our country to the big politics of the Indian Ocean. Details — in the material… the creation of the modest logistics center in Port Sudan is no less important than the freezing of hostilities in the Transcaucasus. Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh ensure that the conflict on Russia’s southern borders does not escalate into a full-scale humanitarian crisis; Russian sailors in Port Sudan seem to be an indication of the fact that Russia intends to seriously engage in the complex foreign policy game now unfolding in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
After the collapse of the USSR, the once formidable Soviet Navy turned into a sad shadow of its former power. Cruisers, destroyers, large anti-submarine warfare ships and large landing ships rusted at the berths, waiting to be cut into scrap metal, and they had to forget about the demonstration of force in distant sea areas. This period lasted almost two decades — not a lot by historical standards, but long enough to turn into a difficult task even the limited restoration of the ocean-going fleet in a situation when it was suddenly needed. If in Soviet times the presence of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean was provided by the ships of the Pacific Fleet, then the honor to restore this presence was granted to the Black Sea Fleet. It so happened that Russia started its return to the big chess game from the Middle East, not from the Far East, and therefore Port Sudan, as the next operating base after Tartus, looked logical.
A convenient location that allows one to control traffic in the Red Sea and, if necessary, to protect one’s ships from pirate raids from the territory of the nearby Somalia, a good bay, a relatively developed infrastructure, absence of foreign policy problems with the country’s leadership give reason to hope that this time the base will not have to be urgently moved.
“The typical peacetime personnel for such a base are to repair ships, a rescue tug, 3-4 units of lower-rank ships,” believes Ilya Kramnik, a Russian International Affairs Council expert. But the key there will most likely be presented in the form of inconspicuous means of intelligence and special forces — the region needs special tools more than purely military ones. For the latter, if necessary, large ships will obviously be sent there — up to and including nuclear submarines and nuclear missile cruisers, given that Russia has obtained an agreement on a possible entry of nuclear-powered ships, but their presence will clearly not be permanent.
The key question now is what are Moscow’s future plans? Figuratively speaking, will Port Sudan remain a southern bastion ensuring Russia’s presence in the Middle East, or will it become the first step towards a full-fledged return of Russia to the Indian Ocean. Russia is awaited in the region. Moreover, not only by countries that were previously in the zone of the Soviet influence, such as Mozambique, Madagascar and the Seychelles, but also other states on the coast of East Africa and islands of the Indian Ocean. In the conditions of Chinese, Indian, European, American economic expansion, the presence of another interested player will give them an opportunity to pursue a more flexible policy, maneuver and negotiate, in exchange providing Russian companies with contracts, and the navy with bases and supply centers.
India is waiting for Russia. More than once the author of these lines had to hear from Indian experts and high-ranking military officials regret that the Russian flag is no longer visible in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi fears the growing appetite of Beijing, which is gradually intensifying its presence in the Indian Ocean, seeking to ensure the security of the supply of hydrocarbons from the Persian Gulf countries and its goods to Europe; these fears are pushing India into the arms of the United States. The Russian squadron in the Indian Ocean, on the one hand, will give New Delhi an alternative to rapprochement with Washington, and on the other hand, it will guarantee Beijing that the safety of its ships in the region will be ensured. It is still difficult to say whether Russia will live up to these expectations and whether it will take the risk of declaring its interests in one of the most strategically important regions of the world. But at least the first step in this direction has already been taken.
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